Selfish or selfless? Participation in violent and non-violent collective action within the Israeli Settler population.

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Abstract

Why do people participate in costly and sometimes deadly collective actions? One explanation is that participation is based on instrumentally rational decision-making processes that require selective incentives to persuade selfish individuals to participate in collective actions. A second explanation is that decisions to participate are based on “value rationality” decision-making processes and a desire to contribute to the collective. In a survey of 656 Jewish residents of the West Bank, decisions to participate in legal demonstrations, illegal occupations and acts of ethnopolitical violence were “value rational”: participation decisions were positively influenced by perceptions of the appropriateness or justice of collective actions and unrelated to the perceived effectiveness of such actions. We also find that participants tend to be motivated by group level values rather than self-enhancement values, indicating that participation tends not to be related to offers of selective incentives. Theoretical and applied consequences of these findings are discussed.
Introduction

Participation in insurgent political action involves a significant drain on individual resources and can involve a risk to personal safety. Yet people will take part in collective actions ranging from legal demonstrations to acts of ethno-political violence. Attempts to understand such participation can be conveniently categorized into two broad theoretical perspectives that reflect opposing philosophies regarding the relationship between individuals and the collectives to which they belong. The first perspective views individuals as fundamentally selfish actors, contributing toward collective actions when they receive individual benefits that accrue directly from such participation. The second perspective blurs the distinction between the individual and the group. Here people participate in collective actions as a function of their identification with and internalization of group goals. This paper examines these competing points of view by investigating individual variance in participation in violent and non-violent political behavior within the Israeli settler community.

The “selfish/instrumental rationality” explanation of participation in collective action

The selfish actor perspective proceeds from the premise that all individual behavior is based on individual level instrumental rationality. Derived from this argument is the notion that participation in costly and potentially deadly behavior - as opposed to taking a “free ride” on the actions of others (Olson, 1965) - is in response to “selective incentives” offered to participants (e.g., Popkin, 1979; Lichbach, 1994; Lupia & Sin, 2003). The use of such selective incentives can render participation instrumentally rational because contributors to collective actions accrue selective private benefits that are additional to the public benefits of a successful rebellion. This perspective does not ignore the importance of ideology (Lichbach, 1994), but characterizes a
high level of commitment to ideology as a willingness to delay selective incentives to the future when victory is obtained (Weinstein, 2004).

Aggregate data suggests that greed may be a motivation for rebellion. Cross country comparisons reveal a negative relationship between per capita income and the likelihood of ethnic or civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), and that lower rates of GDP growth, coupled with increased opportunities of looting from primary exports, increases the likelihood of civil war onset (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). There is equivocal evidence that this relationship might be mirrored at the individual level. MacCulloch (2004) reports analysis of micro level data sets that show a negative relationship between an individual’s relative income level within a country and his or her desire for revolution. However, this analysis did not control for potentially confounding factors such as ethnicity or identification with high or low status groups. Thus we cannot know whether relative economic status was itself a cause of support for rebellion or instead a proxy for other potentially important variables. In fact, focusing on economic indicators leads to an incomplete test of the selfish actor hypothesis. Other potential selfish motivations of participation include the maintenance or enhancement of individual status within the collective. In addition, we might expect that “selfish” participants will be more likely to participate in actions they regard effective in achieving collective goals (Muller & Opp, 1988; Muller, Dietz & Finkel, 1991).

*Individual sacrifice and participation in collective action*

An alternative perspective sees individuals participating in collective action *despite* the individual sacrifices this might entail. Here participation in collective action may not be instrumentally rational but may be “value rational” where action is less sensitive to individual level cost and benefit assessments (Varshney, 2003) and instead driven by a commitment to
group level values that are “protected” from trade-offs (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) and associated with a sense of obligation to act (Tanner & Medin, 2004) despite the economic or social costs an individual might bear (Axelrod, 1994). Two strands of research provide indirect confirmation of the “selfless/value rational perspective”. First, there is some evidence implying that participation in collective actions need not be instrumentally rational. Potential protestors have been shown to be relatively insensitive to the potential individual level costs of participation (Muller & Opp, 1986). In extreme cases such as Jewish resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto during World War II, collective action emerged only when death was deemed unavoidable; an inevitability that made salient value rational estimations of the appropriateness of resistance (Einwohner, 2003). Further indirect support of the “selfless” perspective can be found in research that links individually costly cooperation with a collective to high levels of in-group identification (e.g., Van Vugt, 2001; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). People identify themselves on collective as well as individual levels (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2003; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Smith & Henry, 1996; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994), and there is a general tendency to act in ways that have collective benefits irrespective of individual level benefits (Van Vugt, 2001; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004) even when those collectives are meaningless laboratory constructions (Tajfel 1981; Turner & Oakes, 1997). Identification with a collective is a reliable predictor of protest participation (Klandermans, 2002; Sturmer & Simon, 2004) and support for political protest may indeed be fostered by perceptions about collective rather than individual economic and political circumstances (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Grant & Brown, 1995; Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983; Muller, 1972; Runciman, 1966). Although studies showing the importance of collective identification are significant, they do not directly help us to discriminate between the
“selfish/instrumental rational” and “selfless/value rational” perspectives. Collective identification might be necessary to prompt participation in collective action but it may not be sufficient without selective incentives. In addition, collective identification might simply be a proxy for vulnerability to informal social incentives that encourage participation. To the extent that a person identifies highly with a group, he or she is likely to be more sensitive to such informal selective incentives.

**The present study: Israeli Settlers and participation in collective action**

This paper goes beyond previous research in three respects. First, we investigate the extent to which participation in collective actions is sensitive to the perceived effectiveness of such behaviors in the pursuit of collective goals and contrast this with the importance of cognitive evaluations of the appropriateness or justice of collective actions. Second, we investigate the underlying values of participants and non-participants in collective action. Third, we evaluate these hypotheses with respect to a wide variety of collective political actions including legal behavior, illegal non-violent action as well as ethnopolitical violence and terrorism.

We accomplished these goals by investigating variations in the extremism of protest behavior exhibited by Jewish Israeli residents of the West Bank (*settlers*) against the peace process with the Palestinians. This population was particularly appropriate to the aims of this research as it has a long history of legal, illegal and violent political behavior (*Weisburd, 1989*). This research took place between 1997 and 2000, with the data presented here collected in the first part of 1999. At the time of this research the focus of protest activity was the Oslo peace process with the Palestinian Authority. To protest the Oslo process, Jewish settlers had taken part in
demonstrations, road-blocking campaigns and illegal occupation of land as well acts of violence and terrorism.

Aims and Hypotheses

We investigated the relative validity of the “selfish/instrumental rational” versus “selfless/value rational” perspectives in two ways. First, we evaluated whether participation in different forms of collective action was sensitive to cognitive evaluations of instrumental or value rationality. We reasoned that if participation in collective actions is instrumentally rational, there should be a positive relationship between the perceived effectiveness of a behavior (in terms of achieving collective goals) and willingness to participate in that behavior. Alternatively, if participation in such behaviors is value rational, participants are more likely to be influenced by the degree to which a behavior is seen as “just” or “right”. Additionally we predicted that “just/right” cognitions would be more strongly related that effectiveness cognitions to the dependent variables.

Our second method of evaluating the two alternative perspectives was through an investigation of value priorities. Values are general beliefs about desirable end-states that represent motivational goals (Feather, 2004; Schwartz & Bilsky 1987; 1990; Schwartz, 1995). To investigate the relationship between values and collective action participation we used Shalom Schwartz’s value system theory (1992, 1994, 1995). This theory is distinctive because rather than dealing with one group of values hypothesized to underlie a specific set of behaviors (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) it proposes a value system where different value types in the system represent a motivational continuum allowing us to test competing hypotheses regarding

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1 Examples include the 1994 Baruch Goldstein massacre of 48 Arabs in Hebron and Yigal Amir’s assassination of Yitzach Rabin in 1995. The 2003 arrest of the “Bat Ayin” cell of Jewish terrorists demonstrates the current extent of the problem.
motivational origins of behavioral choices (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1991; Schwartz & Bilsky 1987; 1992). Empirical research across 65 cultures has verified the existence of ten distinct value types that are structured into four different themes (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Schwartz & Bohenke, 2002). Priority given to these value types have been used to predict voting intentions (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998) and voting behavior (Verplanken & Holland, 2002, Study 6), gender relations (Feather, 2004), readiness for out-group contact (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995) and trust in social institutions (Devos, Spini & Schwartz, 2002).

Values which prioritize “selfish” motives in Schwartz’s (2001) values survey are values representing individual power (social power, authority and wealth) and achievement (personal success, ambition) – self enhancement values. For values to influence an individual’s behavior they must be first primed or activated (Verplanken & Holland, 2002, Studies 2 and 3) and must also be of central importance to that individual (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996; Feather, Norman & Worsley, 1998; Feather, 2004; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Thus we expect that self enhancement values will positively influence decisions to participate in collective actions under two conditions. First, salient informational cues need to exist with reference to participation decisions that prime or activate self enhancement values. For example, in contexts where political entrepreneurs offer selective monetary incentives for participation in collective action, these offers will prime selfish values. Additionally, in some contexts other group members who have participated in such collective actions in the past may have received informal selective status or social rewards. To the extent that such selective rewards are salient, we would expect that when people are thinking about whether or not to participate, selfish values will also be primed.
Secondly, these primes will only influence behavior to the extent that self enhancement values are of central priority to an individual. Thus, if we find that the priority people give to self enhancement values positively influences participation in collective actions, we can assume that selective incentives are present in the environment and that more selfish individuals are more likely to respond to those cues by disproportionally deciding to participate in collective actions. No relationship between self enhancement values and participation would imply either the absence of selective incentive cues or their irrelevance to decision-making. Moreover, a negative relationship between these variables would imply that participants in collective actions are responding to “self-sacrifice” cues in the environment.

Three sets of scales representing different values in the Schwartz (2001) survey were used to evaluate the “selfless/value rationality” perspective: “conservatism”, “benevolence” and “universalism”. The value theme *conservatism* consists of “security” (family security, national security), “tradition” (accepting life, religion) and “conformity” (obedience) values. Higher conservatism values signify a commitment to the values of one’s group. If the “selfless/value rationality” perspective is correct and participation in collective action signifies a commitment to group level values, conservatism should be positively related to the dependent variables.

The value theme *self-transcendence* consists of “universalism” (broadminded, equality, world peace) and “benevolence” (interpersonal helpfulness, honesty, loyalty) values. It was predicted that these two self-transcendence values would have different relationships to the dependent variable. Benevolence values indicate interpersonal loyalty and to the extent that participation in collective actions is motivated by loyalty to an immediate collective, we hypothesized a positive relationship between benevolence values and the dependent variables. Universalism values deal with positive relationships between human groups, and between people and nature. Thus we
predicted that if the “collective/value rational” perspective was correct, universalism would be inversely related to intentions to participate as well as to past participation in collective actions. We also recognized that self-enhancement values might be important as a moderator variable and thus may interact with conservatism values. Finally we were interested in evaluating the relative influence values representing selfish motivations (self-enhancement values) and values representing different selfless or collective motivations (universalism, benevolence and conservatism) had on past participation as well as potential participation in different forms of collective political action.

**Research Methods**

*Sample Characteristics*

The sample consisted of 656 Jewish adults that lived in the West Bank. Sixty three percent of the participants were male. Most of the respondents were aged between 25 and 55 (85.2%) and had at least 12 years of formal education (98.1%). Almost all were married (91%). Sixty-six percent were born in Israel, 55% percent identified themselves as orthodox Jews, 29% as secular, and 16% as traditional. The political identity of respondents, as indicated by matching voting intentions in the survey with voting patterns in a national election two months after data collection was completed, was representative of the Jewish population of the West Bank. Table 1 illustrates that voting intentions of the sample were similar to the voting behavior of the settler population at the time of the elections. The major differences concern support for Mafdal (a right-wing religious party) and the Center party (politically moderate), whose survey percentages were higher than actual voting percentages, and for Shas (a Sephardi religious party which is also relatively right-wing in orientation), whose survey percentages were lower. These results mirror differences between voting intentions in the general population shown in national opinion polls
when this research was being conducted and voting behavior in the elections. Between February and May 1999 support for Shas rose, seemingly at the expense of Mafdal, while early support for the Center party weakened as the campaign went on (Elections 1999 supplement, 1999).

**Procedure**

In the period after the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, there was a great deal of sensitivity within the settler community regarding illegal protest. For this reason, the research instrument was distributed via an anonymous mail-out. The research instrument was sent to a random sample of 3000 Jewish residencies in the West Bank. A self-addressed and stamped envelope accompanied the research instrument so that respondents could return the questionnaire anonymously. This method led to a return rate of 27% of all questionnaires that were sent to the correct address\(^2\). Relatively low return rates have little impact on the validity of responses provided that the sample is representative of the population on significant dimensions (Keeter et al, 2000; Pew Research Center, 2004). As indicated by voting intentions, this sample was representative.

**Measures**

**Dependent variables**

We measured attitudes towards participation in legal demonstrations, illegal occupation of land or property, violent political acts targeting Palestinians, and violent political acts targeting Israelis\(^3\). Respondents were asked to indicate whether they had participated in each of these acts in the previous 5 years (coded “0” *no* or “1” *yes* for each act) and indicated their intentions to

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\(^2\) Over 500 questionnaires were sent to incorrect addresses. This may be due to the general mobility of the population along with the fact that settlements often exaggerate the size of their membership and may have set up “dummy addresses”.

\(^3\) This indicated attacks against other subgroups (e.g., peace activists or soldiers forcing them to evacuate their settlements) within the superordinate ethnic group.
engage in each behavior in the event that their settlement was to be dismantled in the context of a peace agreement (coded: “0” unwilling or “1” willing for each act).4

**Independent variables**
Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which each type of protest act was effective when used by Israelis to press for change (1 = “not at all effective” to 4 “very effective”). They were also asked to rate the extent to which each act was “just” or “right” (“mtzodek” in Hebrew; 1 = “never just” to 5 “just”) when used by Israelis to press for change. Values were measured using Schwartz’s “Portrait Questionnaire” (2001). This questionnaire consisted of 27 questions each asking about a specific value. Each question is a portrait of an individual (for example: “Being very successful is important to him/her. He/she likes to impress other people”) and a respondent is asked to rate his or her similarity to the portrait on a 6-point scale (from “very much like me” to “not at all like me”). Scores for each specific marker of different value types or themes were then averaged to produce a scale. The individual values representing the two “self-transcendental” types “universalism” (alpha = .78) and ‘benevolence” (alpha = .76) both formed reliable scales. The “conservatism” (alpha = .80), the ‘self-enhancement” (alpha = .80), and the “openness to change” (alpha = .82) scales were all reliable.

**Results and Discussion**
Reports of past participation and future intentions revealed a politically active sample with only a minority having taken part in illegal or violent activities but significantly more being willing to do so under the threat of forced evacuation from their settlements. Almost six in ten respondents

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4 In the research instrument, participants were asked to indicate their intentions to engage in each protest act (“would do”, “might do”, “would never do”) in the event that their settlement was to be evacuated in the context of a peace agreement. Preliminary analysis found no differences (in terms of their relationships with any of the independent or demographic variables) between the subcategories of “willing” (“would do”, “might do”) so these were subsumed for the sake of clarity into one category in the present analysis.
(N=393) reported taking part in legal demonstrations and nine in ten (N=591) were willing to do so in the future. Over 12% (N=81) reported illegally occupying land/homes and 48.5% (N=381) were willing to do so to rebel against potential forced evacuation of their settlements. Less than two in a hundred participants (N=9; 1.4%) reported violent attacks against Palestinians but over ten in a hundred (N=67) reported a willingness to participate in such behaviors to act against the forced evacuation of their settlement. No participants reported violent attacks against Israelis while 6.4% (N=42) were willing to participate in such acts. While the numbers of people willing to participate in violent attacks were small, extrapolating the findings to a population approaching 250,000\(^5\) indicates the seriousness of the issue. For example, if we assume an adult population of 100,000, approximately 10,000 may be willing to engage in violent attacks against Palestinians in the event of forced evacuation and approximately 6,400 to attack other Israelis under the same conditions.

*Is participation ‘value rational’ or ‘instrumentally rational’?*

To evaluate whether participation in collective actions was instrumentally rational or value rational we conducted separate logistic regression analyses for each dependent variable estimating the relative influence of effectiveness and “just/right” ratings on the predicted odds that an individual would be willing to participate, or reported past participation, in each action. The results are described in Table 2. The extent to which act was perceived to be “just/right” always influenced the odds that a person would be willing to participate and would report past participation in each type of behavior. For example, for every unit increase in the extent to which violent attacks against Palestinians were perceived to be “just/right”, the predicted odds that a person would be willing to participate in such acts increased by a multiplicative factor of 4.96,

and the predicted odds that a person would report past participation increased by a multiplicative factor of 3. In contrast, effectiveness ratings only influenced the odds that a person would be willing to or had participated in illegal occupation of land/homes. In these cases however, the degree to which an act was perceived to be “just/right” had a greater influence on the predicted odds of participation or willingness to participate. For example, for every one unit increase on the perceived effectiveness of illegal occupation, the predicted odds that a person would be willing to participate in such acts increased by a multiplicative factor of 1.86. Conversely, a one unit increased in the extent to which such behaviors were seen as “just/appropriate” resulted in the predicted odds of willingness to participate in such an act increasing by a multiplicative factor of 3.77.

These results illustrate that participation and willingness to participate in these four types of collective actions was a result of value rational rather than instrumentally rational decision making. Participation was robust to variations in the degree to which a type of collective action was seen as effective. This was particularly marked for violent behaviors. Instead, the perceived “justness” of a behavior seemed to be highly influential in influencing past and intended participation.

*Is participation motivated by selfish values or a commitment to group values?*

Next we investigated our hypotheses regarding the influence of different value priorities on participation in these four types of collective actions. We ran four logistic regression analyses estimating the effect of value priorities on the odds that an individual would be willing to take part in legal demonstrations, illegal occupation of land or property, acts of violence targeting Palestinians, and acts of violence targeting Israelis. The results are shown in the first part of Table 3. Hypotheses concerning universalism, benevolence and conservatism were confirmed.
There was an inverse relationship between universalism values and the odds that an individual would be willing to take part in any of the four political behaviors that were measured. For example, for every one unit increase on universalism scores, the predicted odds of a person being willing to take part in violent attacks against Palestinians were reduced by a multiplicative factor of 0.45. There was a positive relationship between conservatism scores and the predicted odds that an individual would be willing to participate in legal demonstrations, illegal occupation of land or homes, violent attacks against Palestinians or against Israelis. For example, for every one unit increase on conservatism scores the predicted odds of a person being willing to illegally occupy land/property increased by a multiplicative factor of 2.15.

In contrast, hypotheses testing the “selfish/instrumental rationality” perspective were disconfirmed. Self-enhancement scores were inversely related to the odds that an individual would be willing to illegally occupy land or property. For every one unit increase in self-enhancement scores, the predicted odds of a person being willing to illegally occupy land or property was reduced by a multiplicative factor of 0.75. There was no relationship between self-enhancement values and intended participation in all other acts of collective action. We then calculated an interaction term “conservatism x self-enhancement” and entered this term, while controlling for the same 5 values as in the first set of analyses, into four separate logistic regression analyses. As shown in Table 3, this interaction term only significantly predicted the probability of willingness to take part in legal demonstrations. Here, for every unit increase in conservatism scores, the impact of self-enhancement on willingness to demonstrate legally increases by a factor of 1.09. In all other cases, the interaction term was insignificant.

We then analyzed whether scores on these values significantly influenced the predicted odds that a participant would report that her or she had taken part in legal demonstrations, illegal
occupation of land or property, or violence targeting Palestinians in the five years prior to the survey. The results are shown in second half of Table 3. Again, hypotheses testing the “selfish/instrumental rationality” perspectives were largely disconfirmed. Self-enhancement was negatively related to the predicted odds that a person had taken part in legal demonstrations, or illegal occupation of land/property, while it was unrelated to participation in acts of violence that targeted Palestinians. The interaction term conservatism x self-enhancement was not significantly related to the predicted odds of a participant having taken part in any of these behaviors. Hypotheses testing the “selfless/value rationality” view were largely confirmed. Universalism values were negatively related to the predicted odds of a participant having taken part in legal demonstrations or acts of violence targeting Palestinians, while both benevolence and conservatism values were positively related to the predicted odds of a participant reporting participation in legal demonstrations.

**General Discussion**

We sought to discriminate between two explanations for individual participation in a range of collective political actions. Specifically, we evaluated the relative importance of the “selfish/instrumental rational” and “selfless/value rational” perspectives. We first investigated the types of cognitions that predicted reported past participation and willingness to participate in legal, illegal and violent political behaviors. We found that an individual’s estimation of the effectiveness of different forms of collective action were not nearly as influential as his or her estimates of the justness or correctness an action. This signifies that participation is more value rational than instrumentally rational. This is not to say that participants would prefer their actions to be ineffective, rather that their decision to participate in a collective action they deem to be “just” or “right” seems to be robust to effectiveness assessments.
We next investigated what way a person’s value motivations influenced his or her willingness to take part in acts of political rebellion and, most noteworthy, his or her willingness to participate in illegal or violent activities. To test the “selfish/instrumental rational” perspective we hypothesized that self-enhancement values would positively influence the predicted odds that an individual would be willing to take part in, or would report past participation in, acts of political rebellion. This hypothesis was disconfirmed. Self-enhancement values were either unrelated to willingness to participate and past participation or, in the case of illegal occupation of land and property, negatively related to the predicted odds of participation.

We also examined whether self-enhancement might have a secondary moderating influence on decision-making but this expectation was also disconfirmed for all but one dependent variable (willingness to participate in legal demonstrations). These results are striking, suggesting that willingness to take part in sometimes risky political acts is not only unrelated to self-enhancement values but sometimes related negatively to such values. This paints the picture of the relatively selfless political actor, rebelling to advance a cause in a way that is unrelated to personal ambitions or in a way that is evidence of an abandonment of personal ambitions.

To test the alternative “selfless/value rational” approach we hypothesized that scores on conservatism and benevolence values would positively influence, and scores on universalism values would negatively influence, reported past participation and willingness to participate in each type of collective action. These hypotheses were generally confirmed. People who were willing to rebel tended to have a “particularist” world view, eschewing universal values and placing a primary emphasis on conformity in ingroup traditions and values.

Based on this analysis, both violent and non violent political activists in this sample seemed to have been motivated not by selfish desires but collective needs or aspirations. In addition, their
decisions about whether to participate in collective actions were less a product of how effective they believed those actions might be and more a function of how correct or just those behaviors were perceived to be within their social/political context. This analysis yields several theoretical and policy related implications. First, if participation in political rebellions, particularly violent rebellions, is value rational, then individual level deterrent/incentive policies are likely to have little impact on participants. In the case of the Israeli settler population specifically, the use of personal incentives is unlikely to be effective in convincing already radical settlers to accept a Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the evacuation of settlements. Of course, from a broader perspective such policies may work if they convince most settlers to accede to evacuation. We found that most settlers were not prepared to take part in violent behaviors. It is possible that those that were so willing may have mistakenly believed that most people in their in-group held similar preferences. Thus, if personal incentives not to rebel induce most people to leave their settlements peacefully, the personal preferences of radical settlers may be suppressed (Kuran, 1989; 1995).

These findings also illustrate a need for further research regarding the types of intergroup relations or contexts that lead people to regard rebellion, and particularly violent rebellion, as appropriate or just. The ethnographic work of Stephen Reicher and colleagues (Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998) that demonstrates the importance of intergroup relations to participation in collective violence is relevant here. If the appropriateness of political behavior is to some extent defined by the actions of relevant out-groups (Drury & Reicher, 2000) many deterrent policies may actually encourage greater participation in more extreme types of collective actions. For example, violent deterrent policies such as collective punishment may both fail to deter previous participants in collective action from again participating, and might
also encourage more extreme behavior by defining the intergroup context as one in which violence is appropriate. However, in order to be clearer about these possible unintended effects of particular deterrent policies, empirical work that explicitly links perceptions of different types of intergroup relations with evaluations of the justification and appropriateness of different forms of collective actions is necessary.

Advantages and limitations of anonymous self-report surveys
There are two potential limitations to this study that must inform our interpretations. First, the use of self-report measures poses accuracy issues that are difficult to avoid in this type of research where the control of the researcher over participants is low. In particular, some participants may have chosen not to report on acts of violence against Palestinians or other Israeli citizens for fear of exposure. While it is difficult to deal with these problems in anonymous surveys, a comparison with other higher response methods such as telephone polling indicates that people may have been more likely to report willingness to engage in illegal behaviors under conditions of anonymity. A 1995 telephone poll of 511 settlers reported only 2.2% of participants being willing to engage in physical confrontations with Israeli soldiers attempting to evacuate their settlements. This survey was conducted prior to the Rabin assassination. In contrast, this survey found 6.4% of participants reporting a willingness to take part in similar behaviors.

Another serious issue concerns a hypothetical group of selfish non-respondents who might have disproportionally decided not to participate. For example, it is possible that more selfish individuals may simply have been less likely to take the time to respond to an 8 page survey delivered to their home. However, distribution of scores on the self-enhancement values scale approximates that of a normal curve (if anything responses were skewed towards the more.

6 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/95/setpoll1.html
selfish end of the scale) with 50.3% of participants averaging above the midpoint on self-enhancement. We cannot however discount the existence of such a subgroup. We can only argue that our results demonstrate that participation in collective actions can and often are selfless and not selfish.

We believe that one particular strength of this study was the use of values to indirectly measure motives. While it is possible to measure selective incentive motivations directly (e.g., Bellman, 2004) it is possible that participants in collective actions may be motivated to internally and externally frame their actions as selfless sacrifice despite underlying selfish motivations. In addition, participation is collective acts are often framed by the collective as selfless when they could be motivated by selfish values. For example, when community leaders speak of their pride in the sacrifice of a few volunteers to the needs of the many, this might prime selfish motives (the need to be admired) which could encourage behavior. However, participants motivated in this way may be unlikely to speak of the desire to be admired and instead frame their behavior as selfless sacrifice.

**Conclusion**

We might question whether this empirical case study is relevant to other contexts, such as Iraqi opposition to American occupation, participation in inter-ethnic riots in Southeast Asia, or fighters in African civil wars. We do not of course claim that our findings will automatically transfer to other situations. In some circumstances people will rebel as a function of immediate or delayed selective incentives and as a consequence of instrumentally rational estimations. However, we do argue that these findings demonstrate that participation in collective political actions need not be instrumentally rational. People will engage in costly and potentially deadly behaviors, they will be ready to kill and to die, not for themselves but for their collective and not
because of estimations that their actions will be effective, but because they believe that such actions are just.
References


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Table 1. A comparison of voting intentions of the sample at the time of survey and real voting behavior in the May 1999 national elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party List</th>
<th>Survey percentage (Jan-Feb 1999)</th>
<th>Voting percentage (May 1999 elections)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>21.95</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafdal</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity (Moledet, Tekuma, Herut)</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>19.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Israel (Labour)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shas</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>11.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meretz</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Way</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel B’Aliyah</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degel HaTorah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Torah Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Influence of effectiveness and “just/right” estimations on willingness to participate and reported past participation in four types of collective actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Legal demonstrations</th>
<th>Illegal occupation of land/property</th>
<th>Violence targeting Palestinians</th>
<th>Violence targeting Israelis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Wald</td>
<td>Log Odds (95% CI)</td>
<td>Wald</td>
<td>Log Odds (95% CI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>1.02 (.70-1.48)</td>
<td>25.25**</td>
<td>1.86 (1.46-2.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just/appropriate</td>
<td>13.64**</td>
<td>2.28 (1.47-3.54)</td>
<td>105.9**</td>
<td>3.77 (2.93-4.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Participation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>1.08 (.87 – 1.33)</td>
<td>10.72**</td>
<td>1.8 (1.27-2.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just/appropriate</td>
<td>20.41**</td>
<td>3.19 (1.93-5.29)</td>
<td>17.43**</td>
<td>2.13 (1.49-3.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** P < .01
Table 3. Influence of value priorities on willingness to participate and reported past participation in four types of collective actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Legal demonstrations</th>
<th>Illegal occupation of land/property</th>
<th>Violence targeting Palestinians</th>
<th>Violence targeting Israelis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Wald</td>
<td>Log Odds (95% CI)</td>
<td>Wald</td>
<td>Log Odds (95% CI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to Participate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>22.64**</td>
<td>.29 (.17-48)</td>
<td>31.59**</td>
<td>.51 (.4-.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>1.54 (.94-2.54)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1.0 (.78-1.33)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
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<td>2.43 (1.54-3.83)</td>
<td>33.11**</td>
<td>2.15 (1.66-2.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Openness to change</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>1.06 (.62-1.84)</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>1.09 (.82-1.44)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-enhancement</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.74 (.49-1.13)</td>
<td>5.631*</td>
<td>.75 (.6-.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism x Self-enhancement</td>
<td>5.99*</td>
<td>1.61 (1.1-2.4)</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.09 (.97-1.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Controlling for Universalism, Benevolence, Conservatism, Openness to Change and Self-enhancement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past Participation</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
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<td>.68 (.54-.86)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>.77 (.57-1.01)</td>
<td>7.14**</td>
<td>.33 (.14-.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
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<td>.93</td>
<td>1.21 (.82-1.77)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.15 (.42-3.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>8.41**</td>
<td>1.44 (1.13-1.84)</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.26 (.87-1.81)</td>
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<td>1.52 (.58-4.15)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.81 (.61-.108)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>1.13 (.76-1.68)</td>
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<td>1.68 (.53-5.34)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-enhancement</td>
<td>6.69*</td>
<td>.74 (.59-.93)</td>
<td>10.72**</td>
<td>.55 (.39-.79)</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.85 (.35-2.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatism x Self-enhancement</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.09 (.96-1.21)</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>1.05 (.88-1.25)</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>.60 (.29-1.25)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05

** p < .01